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The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the
framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the
only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption
in most discrete-variable (DV) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak-
coherent-state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to
the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and
homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption,
without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV) QKD,
which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters
(e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.92.022304 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two remote par-
ties to share an unconditional secret key, which has been proven
in theory [2–4] and demonstrated in experiment [5]. However,
the imperfections of practical devices will compromise the
security of QKD systems [6–14]. So far, three main approaches
have been proposed to bridge the gap between theory and
practice. The first one is to close specific loopholes of devices
with security patches [15], but it could not close potential and
unnoticed loopholes. The second one is device-independent
(DI-) QKD [16–18]. By testing Bells inequality in a loophole-
free setting, security could be obtained without detailed
information about the implementation devices. But DI-QKD is
impractical because an almost perfect single-photon detector
(SPD) is required, and even so the secret key rate is limited
[19,20]. The third approach is to remove as many device
loopholes and assumptions as possible by either modifying the
QKD protocol or refining the security proof. One of the best
results with this approach is measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [21], which can remove all detector loopholes.
Since the detection system is widely regarded as the Achilles’
heel of QKD [6,8,9,13], MDI-QKD is of great importance.
Indeed, recently, MDI-QKD has been demonstrated both in
the laboratory and in the field [22].
Based on the framework of MDI-QKD, the source becomes
the final battlefield for the legitimate parties and Eve. And the
major flaw of the source is that a semiconductor laser diode (S-
LD), which generates a weak coherent state, is normally used
as a single-photon source in most commercial and research
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QKD systems [5,22]. The security of MDI-QKD as well as
BB84 based on S-LD has been proven with decoy state method
[23]. Hence, it has been convinced that if the source can be well
characterized (for example the source flaws could be taken care
of with the loss-tolerant QKD protocol [24]), perfect security
can still be obtained.
Generally speaking, there are two main classes of QKD
protocols: one is discrete-variable (DV) QKD (including
BB84, decoy state BB84, MDI-QKD, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-
Gisin (SARG04) [25], differential phase shift (DPS) [26],
and so on), and the other one is continuous-variable (CV)
QKD [27]. In most DV-quantum communication proto-
cols (e.g., DV-QKD, quantum coin tossing (QCT) [28],
weak-coherent-state blind quantum computing (BQC) [29]),
the phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption. By
assuming that the overall phase is uniformly distributed
from 0 to 2π (in fact, discrete randomization with finite
points, e.g., 10, is sufficient to guarantee QKD security
[30]), a coherent state with intensity |α|2 is reduced into
a classical mixture state, that is, ρ = ∫ 2π0 dθ2π |αeiθ 〉〈αeiθ | =∑∞
n=0
e−|α|2 |α|2n
n! |n〉〈n|. Then it allows one to apply classical
statistics theory to analyze quantum mechanics. Note that
although the security of QKD with nonrandom phase had been
proven [31], the performance is very limited in distance and
key rate.
In this paper, however, we demonstrate a simple quantum
hacking strategy, with both a commercial and homemade
pulsed laser based on S-LD, that allows Eve to actively
violate the phase randomization assumption, without leaving
a trace afterwards. Thus it is effective for most DV quantum
communication protocols. Our attack may also be effective for
CV-QKD, since other parameters of the source (e.g., intensity)
could also be changed. For example, it had been proven that
the local oscillator fluctuation will compromise the security
of CV-QKD [14]. Since S-LDs are widely used in most
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quantum information protocols (e.g., DV-QKD, CV-QKD,
QCT, BQC, and so on) and the security of these protocols
is closely related to S-LD parameters [4], our work consti-
tutes an important step towards secure quantum information
processing.
Our attack differs from previous attacks [6–14]. First, in our
attack, Eve actively violate some basic assumptions required in
the security proof by tampering with an initial perfect source.
Second, unlike the laser damage attack [13] in which Eve also
actively creates loopholes for a perfect SPD, the loopholes
created by our attack are temporary; this makes our attack
impossible for Alice and Bob to detect during the off-time of
the QKD system. Third, our attack also differs from the Trojan
horse attack [32,33]. In our attack, Eve directly breaks some
basic assumptions of QKD protocols, whereas in the Trojan
horse attack, backreflected light is measured to analyze Alice’s
information. And as the best we know, the Trojan horse attack
is invalid for Alice with multilasers [34], but our attack remains
applicable to such systems. Fourth and most importantly, our
attack targets the source instead of SPD. This makes our attack
a serious threat for most quantum information protocols (not
only QKD, but also QCT and BQC).
Here we emphasize that the phase randomization is a
cornerstone assumption in the security of many quantum
communication protocols including QKD, QCT, and BQC. It
is important for not only weak coherent pulse–based protocols,
but also, for instance, parametric down-conversion–based pro-
tocols [35]. And continuous or discrete phase randomization is
also crucial for the loss-tolerant protocol [24]. In fact, without
the phase randomization, the performance of a quantum com-
munication protocol will be dramatically reduced in distance
and key rate [31]. However, we demonstrate experimentally
in a clear manner how easy it is for Eve to violate such
a fundamental assumption in a practical setting. Thus our
work is very general for most quantum information processing
protocols. It works for most DV-QKD, with various encoding
schemes (polarization, phase, and time bin) and various kinds
of lasers (pulsed laser and cw laser). It is also possibly a serious
threat for CV-QKD and other quantum information processing
protocols (such as QCT and BQC).
The basic principle of our attack is as follows. In the
interdriven mode, the semiconductor medium of the S-LD
is excited from loss to gain by each driving current pulse.
A laser pulse is generated from seed photons originating
from spontaneous emission. The phase of the laser pulse is
determined by the seed photons. Since the phase of the seed
photons is random, the phase of each laser pulse is random
inherently [36–39]. However, if a certain number of photons
are injected from an external source into the semiconductor
medium, these photons will also be amplified to generate
laser pulses. Consequently, the seed photons consist of two
parts: one from spontaneous emission and the other part
from the external source. Both parts will affect the phase
of the resulting laser pulse. If the injected photons greatly
outnumber the photons from spontaneous emission, the phase
of the output laser pulse is largely determined by the phase of
the injected photons. Therefore, Eve can control the phase
of Alice’s signal laser by illuminating the S-LD from an
external “control source” and successfully violate the phase
randomization assumption.
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic setup of our experiment. Part
(a) shows Eve’s control devices, in which Eve uses a continuous
wave (cw) laser to tamper with the parameters of Alice’s pulsed
signal laser. Part(b) shows the experimental setups to measure the
parameters of Alice’s signal pulses. The phase of adjacent pulse
is measured by an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer [lower
arm of part(b)], and the waveform of Alice’s signal pulse is directly
measured with a photodiode [upper arm of part(b)]. The output of
photodiodes (D0 and D1) are recorded with an oscilloscope. Cir.:
circulator; PC: polarization controller; Pol.: polarizer; BS: beam
splitter. Solid lines are optical fibers (single-mode fiber for black
color and polarization-maintaining fiber for red color), and dashed
lines are electrical lines. Here we consider Eve’s control laser working
at continuous wave (cw) mode. However, in later parts of this paper,
we will consider the possibility that Eve modulates her control laser
into short photon pulses. This can make it harder for Alice to detect
Eve’s attack.
II. EXPERIMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the schematic setup of our experiment.
We test four sample S-LDs operating in interdriven mode, two
ID300 pulsed lasers from IdQuantique [40] (numbers ID300-1
and ID300-2) and two homemade pulsed lasers with S-LDs
from Sunstar Communication Technology Co., Ltd. (model
SDLP55HMBIFPN, numbers HM-1 and HM-2). To measure
the phase relationship between adjacent pulses, an unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometer is used [see Fig. 1(b)]. The
repetition rate of the signal laser is set to be 206.34 MHz
to match the delay of the interferometer. The output light is
detected by a photodiode (D0) with a bandwidth of 1 GHz,
and the voltage of each pulse is recorded using an oscilloscope
with bandwidth 33 GHz and sample rate 80 GHz (Agilent,
model DSOX93304Q).
Because the central frequency (with a finite linewidth) and
polarization of the signal laser are unstable in experiment, Eve
needs to carefully modulate the frequency and polarization
of her control laser to match her control laser with Alice’s
signal laser. In our experiment, a tuning laser module (model:
81600B-201, Agilent) is used as Eve’s control laser. Further-
more, in Fig. 1 of the main text, we consider Eve’s control
laser working at cw mode. However, at the end of this paper
we consider the possibility that Eve modulates her control
laser into short photon pulses. This can reduce Alice’s ability
to detect Eve’s attack.
In theory, the output voltage after D0 is VP ∝ [1 +
cos(φ + θ0)]/2, where φ is the phase difference between
adjacent pulses, and θ0 is the inherent phase difference between
the two paths of the interferometer. By passively controlling
the interferometer with a temperature controller and vibration
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Experimental results for normalized in-
tensity distribution of V sP . Pc is the power of Eve’s control laser.
Parts (a)–(d) show the intensity distribution of four S-LDs with
Eve’s different control intensities. Part (e) shows the theoretical
simulation (dashed line) of the probability distribution when the phase
of each pulse follows a uniform distribution from 0 to 2π , and the
experimental results of ID300-1 (solid line) when Eve is absent. These
results clearly show that when photons are injected into Alice’s signal
laser, the phase of the signal laser becomes correlated. Here Pc is not
minimized for Eve [41], and a further experiment about the minimal
power is discussed in the following text (see Fig. 4).
isolator, we can stabilize the interferometer within about 2
min. In the test we set the number of pulses to be 25 791
in each experimental point of Fig. 2. (In each experimental
point of Fig. 2, we collect and store 10 M data.) Note that
the repetition rate of the laser is 206.34 MHz and the sample
rate of the oscilloscope is 80 GHz. The number of data is
about (1/206.34 MHz)/(1/80 GHz) ≈ 388 in each pulse cy-
cle. Thus the number of pulses is about 10 M/388 ≈ 25 791),
and the time interval is about 0.125 ms (25 791/206.34 MHz),
which is much lower than the time scale of the interferometer.
Thus we could set V sP ∝ [1 + sin(φ)]/2 for θ0 = π/2.
A uniform distribution of φ from 0 to 2π will produce a
U-type intensity distribution, due to the fact that the mapping
from phase to intensity is nonlinear, VP ∝ sin(φ). Indeed,
when Eve is absent, the same distributions (solid lines of
Fig. 2) are obtained in experiments with both ID-300 and
the homemade pulsed laser. However, a bright light from
Eve could correlate the phase of each pulse and violate the
phase randomization assumption (dashed lines of Fig. 2).
In fact, when photons are injected into Alice’s signal laser,
the intensity distribution of V sP for both ID300 and the
homemade signal laser becomes Gaussian. Consequently,
various quantum hacking strategies can be applied to spy on
the final key [42]. Figure 3(a) shows a schematic setup to attack
a complete QKD system.
Theoretically speaking, Eve can perfectly control the phase
of Alice’s source, and then the intensity distribution should
be a sharp line. However, owing to the following two main
reasons, the measured intensity distribution in Fig. 2 of the
FIG. 3. (Color online) (a) Principle scheme to attack a complete
QKD system by combining our attack with those of [42]. s is Alice’s
quantum signal pulse. Eve splits her bright control pulse into two
parts with a beam splitter (BS1); one part serves as control laser
to tamper with the parameters of Alice’s signal pulse, while the
other part serves as phase reference for Eve to perform the source
attack [42]. (b) A possible countermeasure for Alice to monitor
our attack. Alice splits parts of the light with BS2 and monitors
the power with a photodetector. The optical frequency filter is used
to remove all wavelength-dependent flaws of Alice’s source. The
isolator (Iso.) is used to prevent light from entering Alice’s laboratory
from the quantum channel. (c) Active phase randomization scheme
(PR.), which can guarantee the phase randomization assumption and
partially reduce the risk of our attack, but it cannot entirely remove
our attack (see text for details).
main text follows Gaussian distribution: (1) There exists
phase noise in Eve’s controlling laser, which follows Gaussian
distribution. The measured intensity is the interference of
adjacent pulses (the interval of adjacent pulses is about 5 ns);
thus the experimental results depend on the phase noise of
Eve’s control laser at different times. (2) The interference is
imperfect, including the loss of two paths of the interferometer,
the time jitter of the optical pulse, and so on. Therefore, a
practical Eve cannot perfectly control the phase of Alice’s
source, and the phase noise decides how much information
will be leaked to Eve. Furthermore, although the security of
the BB84 protocol had been proven based on a uniformed
random phase from 0 to 2π [4] and nonrandom phase [31], the
key rate (or mutual information between Alice and Eve) is still
unknown, if the phase of source follows Gaussian distribution
or a general probability distribution, which will be studied in
future.
Furthermore, we note that when the LD is operated in
interdriven mode, the emitted pulses have random phase,
and such phase noise had been used as a quantum random
number generator by many groups [36–39]. However, Fig. 2(e)
of the main text does not prove that the phase of each
pulse follows uniform distribution from 0 to 2π . In fact, if
the phase is uniformly distributed from 0 to π , the same
probability distribution could also be obtained. Thus the
phase randomization assumption must be carefully evaluated,
particularly for a high-speed QKD system [39]. Active phase
randomization [43] is a good countermeasure to guarantee the
phase randomization assumption.
III. COUNTERMEASURE
Figure 3(b) shows a possible countermeasure for Alice to
monitor our attack. It includes three main devices: an isolator
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) Experimental results for V sP , when a
25-dB isolator is placed after the signal laser ID300-1. (b) The
standard deviation ofV sP ∝ sin(φ) andV cP ∝ cos(φ) with different
powers of control light. The standard deviation has been normalized
by that of Pc = 0. The experimental results clearly show that, even
if a 25-dB isolator is used by Alice, the intensity distribution is still
Gaussian type but not U type when Eve uses a cw laser with a power
of 0.6 mW, which means that Eve could still introduce a nonrandom
phase in Alice’s quantum signal. In the test, only a 25-dB isolator
is put after the output of Alice (the photodetector and the filter will
be discussed later). Other setups used here are the same as those for
Fig. 2.
(Iso.), a filter, and a photodetector. But these devices could
not defeat our attack completely, if they are not carefully
configured (see Appendix A for details). (1) The isolator could
not entirely stop Eve’s photons due to its finite isolation (see
Fig. 4), and other imperfections of practical isolators have
been found in a recent paper [33]. (2) Since the wavelength of
Eve’s control laser is the same as that of Alice’s signal laser
in our attack, an optical frequency filter is also ineffective.
(3) Both an optical power meter and classical photodetector
could be foiled by Eve so that they could not accurately show
the power of light from the channel. For example, a short
pulse light might reduce the average power of Eve’s light,
and the finite bandwidth of these monitor devices might worsen
the monitoring results. Furthermore, a recent paper also shows
other imperfections of a practical monitoring photodetector
[44].
An active phase randomization [Fig. 3(c)] [43], or the
cw laser followed by an external intensity modulator and
an active phase randomization scheme, is another important
choice for practical QKD systems, especially when the QKD
system works in a high repetition rate [39]. Then phase
randomization assumption is automatically guaranteed. But
such a countermeasure may not remove our attack entirely,
since Eve can tamper with other parameters (e.g., intensity and
shape, see Fig. 5) to compromise the security of such systems.
For example, the key rate of both CV-QKD and DV-QKD
depends on the intensity of the signal pules [14,45,46]. But
the stability of S-LD (no matter whether it works on pulsed
mode or cw mode) could be damaged by bright light so that
the intensity of Alice’s laser is unstable. Therefore, in this
sense, our attack is also effective for the QKD system with a
cw laser and an active phase randomization scheme. Another
countermeasure is to use a protocol (or security proof) with
an unrandom phase, but the performance of such a protocol is
dramatically reduced in distance and key rate [31].
−1.3
−1.2
−1.1
−1
−0.9
−0.8
A
m
pl
itu
de
 (V
) (a) ID300−1 
 
 
(c) HM−1 
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
−1.5
−1.4
−1.3
−1.2
−1.1
−1
−0.9
A
m
pl
itu
de
 (V
)
time (ns)
(b) ID300−2 
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
time (ns)
(d) HM−2 
 
 
P
c
=0μW
P
c
=50μW
P
c
=100μW
FIG. 5. (Color online) Measured signal pulse waveforms when
Alice’s signal laser is illuminated by a bright light. Eve sends a bright
cw light to Alice’s signal lasers (including both commercial and
homemade pulsed lasers), then the signal pulse of Alice is directly
measured using a photodiode (D1) with bandwidth 40 GHz, an
oscilloscope with bandwidth 33 GHz, and sample rate 80 GHz (model
DSOX93303Q, Agilent). The repetition rate of the signal laser is 10
MHz. It is clearly seen that when Alice’s signal laser is illuminated,
the pulse amplitude and width will be changed.
IV. DISCUSSION
Figure 5 shows that the pulse shape would also be changed
by Eve’s bright light. These changed parameters are also
helpful. For example, the signal pulse is emitted earlier than
that without Eve [47], and the time shift is different for each
S-LD. Furthermore, in the absence of an external field, the
first oscillation is much stronger than the following oscillation,
and a few oscillations appear [48]. But when Eve is present,
more oscillations are observed, and different laser diodes have
different oscillation waveforms. Thus it is possible for Eve
to compromise the security of QKD systems with multilasers
[34] by measuring the characters of signal pules (e.g., time
shift, pulse width, optical frequency).
Here we remark that, generally speaking, the changes of
pulse shape are helpful for both Eve and Alice. Although
more imperfection could be exploited by Eve, more parameters
could be monitored by Alice to discover the existence of Eve.
In fact, both Eve and Alice must be very careful in the cat-
and-mouse game (see Appendix B for details). First, if Alice
wants to completely monitor the changes of pulse shape, some
advanced devices with high speed and bandwidth are required
which may dramatically increase the technology challenge and
cost of a practical Alice. Second, Eve could carefully configure
her attack to ensure that her attack could not increase the error
rate and the changes of pulse shape could not be discovered
by Alice. Third, generally speaking, the changed shape may
actually benefit Eve more than Alice and Bob. This is because
Eve could well be a spy or national security agency such as
the NSA, and so Eve has a much larger power and budget
than Alice and Bob. Thus Eve is probably in a better position
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to exploit the imperfections that she has introduced in the
quantum signal. Furthermore, note that even a tiny violation
of the phase randomization assumption or other parameters
of the source will undermine the very foundation of security
proofs in QKD and it will no longer be fair for Alice and Bob
to claim unconditional security.
Finally, in addition to using a laser, Eve can also attack
the QKD system by using temperature, microwave radiation,
and so on. At the same time, although most quantum hackers
focus on the optical devices of the legitimate parties, Eve
can also exploit imperfections in the electrical devices of the
QKD system. For example, if the electromagnetic shielding
of devices of Alice and Bob is imperfect, Eve could use
microwave radiation from outside to control the parameters of
these devices. These are the subjects of future investigations.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, phase randomization is a cornerstone assump-
tion for many quantum communication protocols, and a tiny
violation of such an assumption is fatal to the security of
such protocols. However, here we demonstrate experimentally,
with both commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, how easy
it is for Eve to violate such a fundamental assumption in a
practical setting. Additionally, besides the random phase, other
parameters (e.g., intensity) of the source could also be changed.
Our attack works for most DV-QKD protocols and possibly for
CV-QKD and other quantum information processing protocols
(e.g., QCT and BQC). Thus our work constitutes an important
step towards secure quantum information processing.
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APPENDIX A: THE SCHEME FOR EVE TO FOIL ALICE’S
MONITOR DEVICES
Now we show that Alice’s countermeasure of the main text
(including an isolator, an optical filter, and a photodetector),
shown in Fig. 3(b), cannot remove our attack entirely.
(i) Isolator. In general, an optical isolator serves to prevent
backreflected photons from returning to Alice’s laboratory.
However, owing to the finite isolation of practical isolators, this
approach only reduces the probability that photons infuse into
Alice’s zone but cannot eliminate this probability entirely. We
perform a proof-of-principle experiment by inserting a 25-dB
isolator after the output port of the signal laser ID300-1. The
experimental results of Fig. 4 of the main text show that the
intensity distribution is still Gaussian type but not U type when
Eve uses a cw laser with a power of 0.6 mW. Thus the phase
of adjacent pulses can be still correlated. Although isolation of
some commercial isolators reaches 50 dB (or Alice can use two
or more isolators in series to increase the isolation), it cannot
totally foil our attack, because Eve can always increase the
power of her control laser. Furthermore, other imperfections
of the practical isolator have been found in a recent paper [33].
(ii) Filter. An optical frequency filter is often used by Alice
to remove any wavelength-dependent flaws. By doing so, only
the light within a narrow band of frequencies can enter Alice’s
laboratory. However, the wavelength of Eve’s control laser is
the same as that of Alice’s signal laser in our attack. Thus
an optical frequency filter is not an effective countermeasure
against our attack.
(iii) Photodetector. Alice can use both an optical power
meter and photodetector to monitor the intensity of light from
a quantum channel, but the optical power meter measures the
average power of light. Thus it could be foiled by Eve who
uses a pulsed laser. For example, Fig. 4 of the main text shows
that a cw laser with an optical power of 0.6 mW is sufficient
to correlate the phase of Alice’s signal pulse. Now, suppose
that the repetition rate of the QKD system is 10 MHz and Eve
uses a pulsed control laser with width of 100 ps. Then the duty
circle of Eve’s pulse is 100 ps/10 ns = 0.001. Thus the average
optical power is reduced to 0.6 mW × 0.001 = 0.6 μW.
A classical photodetector with a discrimination voltage can
be used to monitor the intensity of pulsed light. However,
the classical photodetector could also be cheated due to the
following two reasons:
First, the classical photodetector can be damaged by bright
light so that it may not work as expected. There are two kinds
of classical photodetectors: one based on the PIN, and the
other one based on the APD. Both can be damaged by bright
light [13]. For example, the detector based on InGaAs-APD
from Thorlabs has a maximal input power of 10 mW (model
APD310) and 1 mW (model APD110C). The maximal input
power for the detector based on InGaAs-PIN from Thorlabs
(model PDA8GS) is about 1 mW for cw and 20 mW for 60 ms
[49].
Second, the finite bandwidth of the classical photodetec-
tor may worsen the monitoring results. We experimentally
measure the amplitude of an electrical signal using an
oscilloscope with various bandwidths [Fig. 6(a)]. Furthermore,
the theoretical amplitudes of an ideal Gaussian pulse which
passes a linear time-invariant ideal low-pass filter are also
shown in Figs. 6(b)–6(c). Generally speaking, when a signal
pulse f (t) passes a linear time-invariant device, its amplitude
function becomes
g(t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
G(ω)F [f (t)]eiωtdω, (A1)
where F [·] is the Fourier transformation and G(ω) is the
frequency response function of device. It clearly shows that
devices with finite bandwidth will filter high-frequency signals
and reduce the amplitude of a signal pulse. For simply, we
assume that the signal is a Gaussian pulse and the device is an
ideal low-pass filter, that is,
f (t) = exp
[
− t
2
2σ 2
]
,
G(ω) =
{
1 |ω|  ω0
0 |ω| > ω0 .
(A2)
Here σ is the standard deviation of a signal pulse f (x). If the
3-dB width of f (x) is noted as x, it is easy to check that
x = √8 ln(2)σ . ω0 is the maximal bandwidth of the ideal
low-pass filter.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Part (a) shows the experimentally mea-
sured pulse amplitudes by directly inputting an electrical signal with
amplitude 1 V and 3-dB width 100 ps into an oscilloscope (model
DSOX93304Q, Agilent) with various bandwidths: 1, 5, and 10 GHz.
The electrical signal is generated from a pattern generator (model
12050, Picosecond Pulse Labs). Parts (b) and (c) show the theoretical
amplitude of an ideal Gaussian pulse which passes an ideal low-pass
filter. x is the 3-dB width of the Gaussian signal. ω0 is the maximal
bandwidth of the low-pass filter. In part (b), we set x = 100 ps.
The mismatch between experiment [part (a)] and theory [part (b)]
is mainly due to the simplified version of our model. All the results
show that the monitor devices with finite bandwidth cannot faithfully
characterize the input signal.
The theoretical amplitude of g(t) is shown in Figs. 5(b)–5(c)
of the main text. The results clearly show that monitoring
devices with finite bandwidth could not faithfully characterize
the factual amplitude of the input signal, and Eve could foil the
monitoring devices with a sharp pulsed signal. Although the
test of Fig. 6 is performed for an electrical signal, the results can
be directly applied to the photodetector with finite bandwidth.
For example, suppose that the gain and discrimination voltage
of the photodetector are 104 V/W and 0.2 V, and that Eve uses
a pulsed control light with a 3-dB width of 100 ps and a peak
power of 100 μW. Then the expected output voltage of the
photodetector should be 1 V, which is much larger than the
discrimination voltage, 0.2 V.
Figure 5 of the main text also shows that if the bandwidth
of Alice’s photodetector is high enough (e.g., >5 GHz), Eve
can be discovered. (Note that generally speaking, the gain of
the photodetector will be decreased when the bandwidth is
increased, but here we simply assume the gain is independent
of the bandwidth.) However, if the bandwidth of the pho-
todetector is limited (e.g., 1 GHz), the factual output voltage
is lower than the discrimination voltage, 0.2 V. Alice cannot
discover the existence of Eve. Note that Fig. 2 of the main
text has shown that 100 μW is sufficient for Eve to break
the phase randomization assumption. Furthermore, a recent
paper also shows other imperfections in a practical monitoring
photodetector [44].
Therefore, the possible countermeasure of Fig. 3(b) of the
main text could be cheated by Eve if the devices are not
carefully configured. Furthermore, illumination by a bright
light changes not only the phase but also the pulse waveform,
including its width, amplitude, and shape. Although we still do
not know how Eve can obtain more information by exploiting
such a modified waveform, it remains possible for Eve to attack
the QKD system.
APPENDIX B: A SIMPLE DISCUSSION ABOUT FIG. 5
Figure 5 of the main text clearly shows that when the signal
laser is illuminated by bright light, the pulse shape would
also be changed. Generally speaking, the additional changes
are helpful for both Eve and the legitimate parties. More
imperfections can be exploited by Eve to spy the final key,
and more parameters can be monitored by Alice to discover
the existence of Eve. But it is still possible for Eve to perform
our attack.
Theoretically speaking, Eve could perform a suitable attack
to ensure that the modification of the pulse shape would not
increase the error rate between Alice and Bob. In fact, Eve
can perform the intercept-and-resend attack and ensure that
the error rate is lower than a reasonable value. For example, in
the system with multilaser diodes, she first measures the time
shift of each laser diode to determine Alice’s state. Then she
can resend a faked state to Bob according to her measurement
results. In this case, if the time shift is distinguishable for each
laser diode (it is possible according to Fig. 5), Eve could know
the state sent by Alice. Then she can resend a perfectly faked
state to Bob according to her measurement. Thus no additional
error will be introduced, and the legitimate parties could not
discover the existence of Eve by monitoring the error rate.
Therefore, the main battlefield for Alice and Eve is the
monitor devices, and both of them must be very careful in the
cat-and-mouse game.
For Alice, she may discover the existence of Eve by
carefully monitoring the parameters of the signal laser. But
since the change is tiny in some parameters, some advanced
devices with high speed and bandwidth (e.g., photodetectors,
analog-digital convertors, or time-amplitude convertors, and
so on) are required for Alice, which may dramatically increase
the technology challenge and cost of a practical Alice. For
example, the time shift for ID300 lasers is about 100 ps; thus
if Alice wanted to characterize the time shift of her pulses, the
bandwidth and sample rate of Alice’s analog-digital convertor
should be larger than 40 GHz (generally speaking, at least
four points are needed to recover a pulse). Furthermore, the
bandwidth and sample rate should be increased for homemade
lasers (see Fig. 5 of the main text for HM-1 and HM-2), since
much smaller changes are introduced.
For Eve’s part, she should carefully configure her attack
to foil Alice’s monitor devices. (1) Eve may carefully stable
her controlling laser and match the optical frequency of her
controlling laser with that of Alice’s signal laser, so that,
excepting the random phase, many tiny changes will be
introduced on the pulse shape. Taking the homemade lasers
(HM-1 and HM-2) as an example, Eve’s light will correlate
the phase of each of the pulses [see Figs. 2(c) and 2(d) of the
main text], but Figs. 5(c) and 5(d) of the main text show that the
changes of pulse shape are very tiny. (At least, compared with
ID300-1 and ID300-2, we do not find any obvious changes in
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the pulse shape using a photodetector with 40-GHz bandwidth,
an oscilloscope with 33-GHz bandwidth, and a sample rate of
80 GHz); thus if Alice wants to discover the changed shape
of HM-1 and HM-2, advanced devices with higher bandwidth
and sample rate are required. (2) Eve may reduce the risk of
being discovered by spying parts (not all) of the final key.
For example, it has been proven that a small fluctuation of
intensity will dramatically reduce the secret key rate of decoy
state BB84 protocol [50]. Thus she still could obtain parts
of the final key by trivially changing the intensity of Alice’s
signal laser. In fact, it has been shown that if the intensity
of Alice’s signal pulses fluctuates 1%, 2%, and 3%, the final
key rate will be reduced by 11.86%, 23.91%, and 36.17%,
respectively [50]. (The simulation was performed based on
the experimental parameters of Ref. [34b].)
Furthermore, generally speaking, the ability for Eve to
change other parameters in an optical signal may actually
benefit Eve more than Alice and Bob. This is because Eve
could well be a spy or work for a national security agency such
as the NSA, and so Eve has a much larger budget than Alice
and Bob and thus is probably in a better position to exploit the
imperfections that she has introduced in the quantum signal.
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